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RECENT DECISIONS
Criminal Law-Power of the United States to Punish for Treason Committed Outside the United States-The defendant, Douglas
Chandler, was indicted for treason, the indictment containing one
count which charged that the defendant, who owed his allegiance to
the United States, "committed 23 overt acts at various places in Germany in furtherance of his treasonable adherence to that country, or itsagents." Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground
(among others) that it did not state facts sufficient on its face to constitute an offense against the United States, for the reason that the
Constitutional definition of treason did not "comprehend an adherence
to the enemy by one residing in an enemy country," but included only
an adherence to the enemy by a person residing within the United
States; therefore, the defendant contended, the United States had no
authority to punish him. Held: Motion denied. There is no express
territorial limitation placed on the crime of treason by the United
States Constitution.' Congress, by enacting Section 1 of the Criminal Code, 2 has defined the locus of the crime as "within the United
States or elsewhere," without violating the Constitutional definition of
treason, and a "natural" interpretation of that statute is that it was
"directed at the crime of treason wherever the treasonable acts are
committed, whether territorially or extra-territorially." United States
v. Chandler, 72 F. Supp. 230 (1947).
The power of Congress to punish the crime of treason against the
United States comes directly from the Constitutional provision which
defines the crime,3 but the same provision also expressly limits
Congress' power to that of punishment. 4 In contrast to the broad
scope given to the substantive nature of this crime by the English
statute5 and the statutes of the colonies as those laws existed at
the time of the American Revolution, the tenor of the arguments among
' United States Constitution, Art. III, sec. 3, cl.1: "Treason against the United
States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort."
2 Section 1, Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C.A. sec. 1, p. 4: "Whoever, owing allegiance
to the United States, levies war against them, or adheres to their enemies, giving
them aid and comfort, within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of
treason."
3
United States Constitution, Art. III, sec. 3, cl. 3: "The Congress shall have power
4 to declare the punishment of treason . . ."
United States v. Greathouse, Fed. Cas. No. 15,254, 4 Sawy. 457, 2 Abb. 364
(1863); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 24, 65 S.Ct 918, 89 L. Ed. 1441
(1944) ; Horace J. Bridges, "A Suggestion Toward a New Definition of Treason," Journal of Criminal Law, 30:470484, at 478, 479, (1939) ; Willard Hurst,
"Treason in the United States," 58 Harvard Law Review, 226-272, 395-444, 806857, at 235, 395 (1944-45).
5Treason Act, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 2. For the provisions of this statute
as it existed before the American Revolution and as it exists in this century,
see Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd. ed., Vol. 6, pp. 419-426 (1932).
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the men who framed the United States Constitution, concerning the
treason clause, seems to indicate clearly that the scope of the offense
was to be strictly limited, rather than broadened. 6 The Constitution
itself was to be the defining source, and only those acts made treason
by it were to be so considered. The power of Congress, therefore, was
restricted to the power of punishment only, and not to a determination
of what acts constituted the offense.' Having defined what acts
should constitute the crime of treason, however, the Constitution is
silent on where those acts must or may be committed. As the court
in the instant case pointed out, the limiting phrase "within the United
States" had been inserted in the original draft of the provision, following each act defined by that draft to be treasonable, but the phrase
was left out of the final draft because it was thought by the framers
to be too restrictive of United States' jurisdiction." With the foregoing principles in mind, Congress could, and did, enact section 1 of
the Criminal Code to read: "Every person, owing allegiance to the
United States, who levies war against them or adheres to their enemies,
giving them aid and comfort within the United-States or elsewhere,
is guilty of treason," 9 without violating the Constitutional definition of treason. 10
Do the words "or elsewhere", because of their grammatical position
in the statute, qualify only the phrase "giving aid and comfort", or
do they apply equally to the phrase "adheres to"? Defendant in the
Chandler case" insisted on the former view; the court decided on
the latter.'12 Mr. Hurst, in his exhaustive analysis of the treason
provision, says that no physical distinction was intended by the framers
of the Constitution between the two phrases mentioned, but that the
latter was explanatory of the former.' 3 It has long been thought
that no territorial limitation was placed on the crime of treason-a
proclamation issued in 1917, after reciting the provisions of section 1,
Criminal Code14 and the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision,' 5 discussed
the acts which had been held treasonable up to that time, and then conHurst, footnote 4, at pp. 395-409.
7 Ibid.
8 United States v. Chandler, 72 F. Supp. 230, 234 (1947). See also, Hurst, footnote 4, at pp. 252-3, 399-402.
9 Italics are the writer's. This is the wording used in R.S. sec. 5331, Act of April
6 See

30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112, which was repealed by section 341 of the Criminal
Code. The only changes which have been made, however, are the substitution
of the word "whoever" for the words "Every person," and the omission of the

word "who", which appeared before the word "levies". Historical Note, 18 U.
S.C.A. sec. 1, p. 4.

10 United States v. Chandler, supra, note 8, at p. 233.

21Ibid.
12Ibid.
23 Hurst, op. cit., at p. 402.
'2 See footnote 2, supra.
Is See footnote 1, supra.
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tinued: "Such acts are held to be treasonable whether committed within the United States or elsewhere .
,,16
"..
Little limitation seems to be placed on the power of th6 United
States to punish other offenses, not treasonable, which are committed
outside the territory of the United States by citizens of this country.
Although it has been said that in general the power to punish for criminal offenses does not extend beyond this country's territorial jurisdiction,"7 yet in United States z. Bomwian, cited by the court in
the Chandler case,"8 acts which were fraudulent against the United
States as stockholder in a Fleet Corporation were held punishable by
the United States, though the acts were committed on the high seas
and within the jurisdiction of Brazil, a foreign country, and even
though the statute there under consideration 9 contained no express
declaration making it applicable to acts committed outside the jurisdiction of the United States.2 0 Again, in Blackmer v. United States,
where the taxing power of this country was in question, the Supreme
Court held that the jurisdiction of the United States over an absent
citizen is in personam, because he is personally bound to take notice
of laws which are applicable to him; the court there also stated that
a citizen residing in another country continues to owe allegiance to
the United States, and because of the obligations of citizenship, the
United States retains its authority over him.21 Nor is there anything in international law which prevents the United States from taking
jurisdiction of this crime; Mr. Justice Story, writing in the earlier
days of American jurisprudence, says that although the jurisdiction of
a nation, for the purposes of punishing offenses of a criminal nature,
is limited to its own territory, yet where a citizen of that country is
involved, it is a different matter, and that the law of nations does not
prevent a State from exercising jurisdiction over its subjects traveling or residing abroad, since they remain under its personal suprem2
acy 2
Viewed in the light of the foregoing principles and authorities,
it seems logical enough to conclude, as the court did in the instant
case, that, where a United States court has obtained personal jurisdiction of a citizen who has been brought to trial for the commission
of treasonable acts, the fact that those acts were committed in a foreign
country should not prevent punishment of them by the United States.
-J n H. STAUBER
See Historical Note, 18 U.S.C.A. sec. 1, p. 4.
27 United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 264, 14 S.Ct. 109, 37 L.Ed. 1071 (1893);
Story, Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed., sec. 540, pp. 450-1.
IsUnited States v. Chandler, supra, note 8, at p. 233.
19 Section 35 of the Criminal Code, as amended by c. 194, 40 Stat. 1015.
20
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 43 S.Ct. 39, 67 L.Ed. 149.
21Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 52 S.Ct. 254, 76 L.Ed. 382.
22 Story, footnote 17, supra.
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